SYNOPSIS

Beyond the direct effects of the ongoing trade war, a key risk to the ASEAN economies lies in the collateral impact on food supplies and prices, especially if China and other “tariffed” countries react and seek alternative sources of food.

COMMENTARY

The United States and China are locked in a cycle of escalating tariffs, with likely knock-on impacts on global food supplies and prices. In response to increases in tariff rates imposed by the US on China’s exports, China hit back with additional tariffs on US$21 billion worth of US agricultural products in March 2025. Beijing’s retaliatory tariffs will mean an additional 10 per cent tariff on soybeans, sorghum, beef, pork, aquatic and dairy products, fruits, and vegetables, and an additional 15 per cent tariff on wheat, corn, maize, and chicken from the US. Given the tense words exchanged by leaders and officials on both sides in recent days, neither side appears ready to back down from these trade measures.

The food security concern for ASEAN states is whether the trade war will impact the supply and prices of food in a region where 37 per cent, or 251 million people, cannot afford a healthy diet. Many Asian states rely heavily on imports for their food. Wheat is used in household staples such as noodles and bread, while corn and soybeans are used for food and livestock feed.

Reductions in China’s Imports from the US

While it is still difficult to tell how supply chains will be reconfigured, a recently established Tariff Simulator at MIT’s Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) makes conducting a rough and ready scoping assessment possible. Essentially, the trade war’s collateral impacts on Southeast Asia arise from the likely diversion of its food trade to China from the region’s primary sources.

Given China’s tariffs, US farmers and traders are likely to export less to China. In turn, China will look to alternative non-US sources to meet its food requirements. The first step in sizing up the risks to ASEAN countries is to assess the extent of the expected decrease in China’s food imports from the US.

Analysis using the Tariff Simulator reveals that in the case of soybeans, which China imports most from the US, the additional 10 per cent tariff will result in a reduction of US$618 million in China’s imports from the US. For wheat, an additional 15 per cent tariff will translate to a decrease of US$237 million in imports. For corn, it will be a reduction of US$169 million.

Regarding meat, China’s imports of poultry, pork, and beef are likely to be reduced by US$14 million for poultry, US$90 million for pork, and US$21.3 million for beef.

Sizing Up the Collateral Effects on ASEAN Food Security

The risks to ASEAN countries become more apparent when one considers where China will get its food to compensate for the shortfalls arising from the trade war. The analysis will focus on the major wheat, corn, and soybean exporters.

In the case of wheat, China’s additional tariffs will turn away 752,000 tonnes of exports from the US, based on 2024 prices. China will likely turn to Canada and Australia to make up for 82 per cent of the shortfall. The ASEAN country most impacted by this will be Indonesia, the largest Asian importer of wheat from Canada (2.5 million tonnes) and Australia (3.4 million tonnes). The other ASEAN states impacted are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore, which together import 1.3 million tonnes from Australia and 5.3 million tonnes from Canada.

The scale of the risk for wheat looks moderate, but it is not insignificant. China’s additional wheat imports translate to roughly 13 per cent of Indonesia’s imports from Canada and Australia, or 11 per cent of the total imports of the other five ASEAN countries.

In the case of corn, which totals 628,000 tonnes to be bid over between China and the ASEAN countries, not excluding other possible competitors, more than 81 per cent will be sourced from Ukraine and Myanmar. Vietnam and Singapore import 130,000 tonnes of corn from Ukraine, while Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore import over 2.1 million tonnes from Myanmar.

As for soybeans, roughly 1.13 million tonnes will be bid over, of which approximately 80 per cent will be drawn from Brazil. Among ASEAN countries, Vietnam and Malaysia will likely be the most impacted, as the total of their soybean imports from Brazil is 1.16 million tonnes, which is almost the same as the amount China will need to source.

Further Price Risks and Uncertainties

To cope with the increased competition from China arising from the trade war, one imperative is for affected ASEAN countries to seek import diversification, such as redirecting their imports to US companies, which usually export to China, or find other sources.

However, renegotiating contracts will take time and may require bilateral trade facilitation and brokering by states. It may also come at higher prices to import from the US, and heftier shipping costs owing to distance. For countries like Singapore, for instance, it will entail finding and accrediting more farms and companies from other countries which can meet Singapore’s food safety standards depending on the commodity.

There are other risks not yet included in the previous simulations, but which are worth considering. Firstly, China may further raise its tariffs, or other countries could similarly impose their tariffs on the US, thus implying further costly renegotiations down the road. Secondly, restrictions beyond tariffs, such as China’s suspension of import licenses for key US soybean exporting companies, may be applied. Thirdly, the possibility of an upward price spiral owing to speculation among traders, as in the 2007/8 global food price crisis, cannot be discounted. Lastly, the US tariffs could further trigger inflation and economic crises in ASEAN, thus aggravating food affordability issues.

Regional Imperatives

Amid the uncertainties and reconfigurations in imports, the region can therefore expect an increase in food prices. Beyond bilateral trade facilitation, ASEAN countries may explore regional bulk purchases to increase their negotiating power with sellers. Equally critical will be their ability to build contingency plans to support the poor households.

If the impending crisis is to be weathered, ASEAN countries must look into adapting or transforming their food supply chains by adopting agricultural technology, expanding intra-regional trade, and developing stockpiles beyond rice. The crisis may yet serve as a push for greater “collective self-resilience”, whereby ASEAN countries, individually or in concert, seek to address the structural problems faced by agriculture by providing more support to their dwindling farmers, who are also ageing.

About the Authors

Jose Ma. Luis Montesclaros is a Research Fellow and the Food Security Lead at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Kayven Tan is a Senior Research Analyst at NTS Centre.

SYNOPSIS

The task of securing the world against biological risks is complicated by enforcement and information challenges. A security-health coordination framework is crucial for securing cooperation among a diverse set of actors with different but converging mandates.

COMMENTARY

If the COVID-19 pandemic taught the world anything, it is that global health systems were unprepared for a crisis of that scale. The challenge now is whether those lessons will be applied to strengthen defences against the next unknown biological threat – Disease X.

The protection against global catastrophic biological risks is currently included in several international conventions and policies, each with its own definitions of what is being secured and against whom. There is the need for a Security-Health Coordination Framework (SHCF) to harmonise approaches and definitions.

This framework operationalises the broader notion of promoting health security, i.e., the promotion of global health as a public good. Specifically, an SHCF serves to engage security and health actors in improving the implementation of protocols related to their respective mandates.

The Global Landscape for Mitigating Catastrophic Biological Risks

One type of biological threat focuses on biosecurity, traditionally seen as preventing pathogens from being misused by ill-intentioned actors.

Key security-focused conventions addressing biosecurity include the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological and toxin weapons, and UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which mandates that states prevent non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including biological weapons, for harmful purposes.

Organisations like the World Health Organization play a crucial role in global biosecurity governance, particularly through laboratory guidelines and the broader International Health Regulations, which aim to prevent and respond to public health emergencies.

This contrasts with biosafety, on the health side, which focuses on protecting individuals, laboratories and communities from accidents within laboratories.

The traditional health ambit also includes managing emerging and re-emerging diseases that could result from climate-induced animal migration and disease movements. The World Organisation for Animal Health focuses on preventing the transmission of zoonotic diseases, while the Food and Agriculture Organization addresses biosecurity in agriculture, including food safety and plant protection.

These frameworks, while distinct in their mandates, intersect in managing biological risks. They therefore require the cooperation of all sectors in ensuring a robust framework for mitigating such risks globally.

Challenges in Managing Global Biological Threats

The BWC, as the primary overarching international instrument governing biological agents with a degree of transparency and verification mechanisms, provides a good starting point for promoting cooperation among countries.

However, a significant gap with the BWC compared to other weapons conventions is the absence of a centralised oversight institution for biological weapons, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency for nuclear weapons and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons for chemical weapons. This lack of institutional oversight hampers efforts to ensure compliance, transparency, and accountability in the global biosecurity framework.

Additional challenges arise from the unique nature of biological threats. In contrast with nuclear and chemical threats, which are constrained by the need for specialised materials and infrastructure, biological threats (such as pathogens) are practically invisible, self-replicating, and capable of evolving, making containment very difficult.

Once released, pathogens can spread unpredictably across borders, mutate into more virulent or drug-resistant forms, and remain in the environment or host populations indefinitely, complicating response and mitigation efforts.

Additionally, chemical and nuclear threats are largely man-made and state-controlled. On the other hand, biological threats can emerge naturally through pandemics and zoonotic spill-over events, making it impossible to eliminate risk and requiring continuous surveillance, preparedness, and rapid response capabilities.

The Need for a Security-Health Coordination Framework

The health sector is more difficult to govern since it is relatively decentralised and involves multiple actors and agencies. These include private companies developing biotechnology products, government hospitals, research agencies and laboratories.

Myriad avenues exist for actors to misuse biotechnology products; even the simplest R&D processes can have a dual-use that could inflict significant harm on nations or groups.

Implementing the provisions of the BWC, therefore, requires further cooperation from health actors and the broader institutions for health-related biosecurity governance to enable credible reporting of countries’ practices for mitigating biological risks.

These health actors possess the necessary infrastructure and critical data detect, assess, and respond to biological threats across different sectors. They are also uniquely adept at diagnosing and treating infectious diseases, which are crucial in distinguishing between natural outbreaks and potential attempts at bioterrorism.

At the same time, the health sector will need to work closely with the security sector in developing and enforcing biosecurity guidelines for risk assessment, threat mitigation, and crisis response planning. For instance, preventing the illicit trade of wildlife is not strictly within the purview of health agencies, but rather under the jurisdiction of trade and border control officers. Yet, such goods can be sources of zoonotic diseases, especially for countries which share land borders, hence requiring greater capacity to monitor these borders.

Furthermore, improper storage practices for licit goods can lead to an increase in infections among animals which could lead to disease evolution and possibly zoonoses, as evidenced by the findings of an increase in rat coronaviruses, from the earlier stage in the supply chain when rats are caught, to the time when they are sold in wet markets and restaurants in certain countries.

Military medicine best exemplifies the intersection of security and health by combining medical expertise with strategic preparedness to address biological threats and public health emergencies. It can play a crucial role in biodefence, disease surveillance, and outbreak response, often pioneering advancements in vaccines, medical countermeasures, and trauma care that benefit both military and civilian populations.

However, a key downside is that military medicine typically operates within the defence community, limiting broader engagement with civilian health sectors and public health networks. Its association with national security may also lead civilian health institutions to be sceptical of defence-driven biosecurity policies.

Finding a Common Language

A critical challenge and starting point in rolling out an SHCF involves addressing differences in definitions over what is being secured, or securitised, and against whom.

The security sector typically views biosecurity through the lens of national defence and threat prevention, focusing on preventing the deliberate misuse of biological agents, controlling access to sensitive materials, and enforcing strict regulations. In contrast, the health sector leans more towards biosafety, prioritising the protection of researchers, healthcare workers, and the public from accidental exposure to infectious agents, as well as ensuring adherence to laboratory best practices and effective disease surveillance.

Moving forward, finding common ground in addressing these differences is crucial for facilitating collaborative decision-making and increasing trust between sectors and actors. Developing integrated biosecurity strategies will ultimately strengthen global responses to present and future biological threats. To begin with, there is a need for a Security-Health Coordination Framework to harmonise the approaches and definitions.

About the Authors

Jose Ma. Luis Montesclaros and Jeselyn are, respectively, Research Fellow and Research Analyst with the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. Mely Caballero-Anthony is Professor and Head of the NTS Centre. She is also the Biosecurity and International Security Lead of the Asia Centre for Health Security. The authors thank Mr Julius Cesar Trajano of NTS Centre for his review of an earlier draft of the paper.

We are pleased to bring you the tenth issue of Beyond Relief!.

In our Feature Article, Ms Lim Junli  discusses the recent upheaval at USAID and its impacts on the humanitarian sector in Southeast Asia.

This issue’s On the Ground features some of the initiatives and projects that members of the Singapore Humanitarian Network (SHN) have been participating in. It also features a snapshot of the monthly gatherings of the SHN.

Our members from the academic community have also been keeping themselves busy. This issue includes highlights of an edited book, several commentaries and three journal articles, covering a diverse range of topics including humanitarian diplomacy,  and disaster policy in Southeast Asia.

In the Spotlight features the upcoming Humanitarian Forum, and Fair organised by CHARIS. The forum will showcase expert speakers, uplifting music, and networking opportunities, catering to all levels of interest in humanitarian work.

SYNOPSIS

The uncertainty caused by tariffs and trade disputes affects food security. Increases in geopolitical tensions will undermine the best plans to maintain global supply chains, encouraging countries to develop alternative ones. Consumers in Southeast Asia, even though far from the geographic areas of dispute, will ultimately suffer from interruptions in food availability and price hikes. National strategies to ensure food security are needed.

COMMENTARY

Salvos of tit-for-tat tariffs have been fired between Canada, Mexico, China and the US ever since the latter declared new tariffs on February 1. While negotiations will take place between them to avoid an all-out trade war, uncertainty will prevail in the short term and affect the forward prices of key traded agricultural commodities.

Importing countries which rely on global supply chains for food will need to start planning for alternate sources and take whatever domestic action is necessary to ensure food availability. The experience acquired in dealing with the consequences of tariff impositions during the first Trump administration will be valuable in formulating proactive strategies to avoid negative impacts on all four dimensions of food security, namely, availability, access, utility, and stability.

Although the current round of the tariff war is limited to just four countries, spillover effects are likely in terms of disruptions to supply chains and among food/feed items that are traded as commodities, resulting in price fluctuations. Asian countries that import from these countries may see increased prices, which ultimately translate into food price inflation. And consumers, even those far removed from the dispute areas, will likely see higher food prices.

Tariffs and Their Potential Impact on the Food Trade

As happened during the first Trump presidency, US tariffs on Chinese goods will further encourage China to find alternative export markets. For example, when Trump imposed food tariffs on China in 2018, the latter, the world’s largest soybean importer, developed alternative supply markets to import from elsewhere, especially South America. In anticipation of a repetition, Brazil, a major exporter, reportedly increased its soybean plantings to 47 million hectares in the current season, its largest ever.

Asian exporters might find new opportunities in North American markets if US consumers seek alternatives to higher-priced domestic products. However, a downside is also possible in that countries that rely on the US as a large export market may be forced to reduce production in the short term, thereby affecting the livelihoods of small producers. For food items in which the US market is sizeable, and production has not been reduced, the tariffs may result in some “dumping” at lowered prices to other countries. This may happen to Vietnam’s seafood exports to the US.

Countries exporting to the US may further experience a “slowdown” effect on their overall economies, leading to lower domestic consumer demand. For example, the US is the biggest export market for China, India, and Vietnam, so tariffs will ultimately affect consumer spending power in these countries.

There is a possibility that Asian farmers may face increased competition from North American agricultural produce that is redirected away from China due to the tariffs. For example, with US feed and oil soybeans becoming less competitive in China due to tariffs, American producers might target Asian markets and grow more non-GMO food, therefore increasing competition with Asian farmers of soybean.

Will Trump 2.0 Stimulate Asia To Be More Self-Sufficient in Food and Feed?

The trade policies of the second Trump administration may nudge Asian governments to become more food-independent and increase the potential for Asia to reduce import dependency, especially in subregions like ASEAN. They will also force Asia to develop more sustainable and stable relationships with countries that trade in commodities essential for food and feed security.

Indeed, the size of the demand market in Asia – 1.4 billion people in China, 1.4 billion people in India, and over 670 million people in ASEAN – suggests that developing a strong intra-Asian food market based on sustainable food systems should be a target for the region.

Regional differences, however, exist in such a diverse region as Asia. For example, in South Asia, increasing food self-sufficiency may have to be a priority due to the relatively large poor population, unlike in Southeast Asia, where the high GDP per capita in small states like Singapore and Brunei allows food to be imported from overseas sources.

What of ASEAN?

ASEAN is in the midst of developing its post-2025 vision and strategies for its food, agriculture, and forestry (FAF) sectors. The previous FAF vision for 2016-2025 aspired to integrate ASEAN into global markets. It is time now to focus on increasing intra-ASEAN and intra-Asian trade in food and securitising its food supply chains with more reliable partners who have the potential to grow more, such as Australia.

Many ASEAN member states have a high import dependency ratio on items like wheat, soybeans, and corn. Singapore depends on over 170 countries to meet 90 per cent of its food needs while Indonesia, the world’s largest importer of wheat, imports 100 per cent of its wheat from multiple countries. ASEAN should consider developing mechanisms to conduct collaborative public-private research that leads to new crop varieties and agronomic practices that result in increased production and consequently reduced import dependency, as Brazil did for the Cerrado region.

ASEAN should consider adopting a “preparedness” paradigm for food security in which country-level plans are in place to meet disruptions while concurrently increasing self- sufficiency and diversifying import sources. Many ASEAN policies, such as responsible investment, have been endorsed, and many mechanisms exist for the grouping to develop joint anticipatory action.

Going Forward

While preparing for the fallout from the tariff and trade wars, longer-term strategic concerns, such as population growth, demographic shifts, etc., will continue to underscore the challenges to meeting food demand. Asia as a region is currently self-sufficient in rice, seafood, and vegetable oil. So, the expectation is that the security associated with these three food items will be relatively unaffected.

The need to develop new supply chains will encourage Asian countries to reassess their trade relationships, diversify their import sources and reduce reliance on any single country, as in the case of Singapore’s “Resilience” Strategy for food imports. This could lead to new balances between food surplus and food deficit countries. So, while the current concern about tariffs is on North America and China, the ripple effects will likely be felt beyond these countries. Policy re-calibrations between countries may be needed to secure food security in Asia.

About the Author

Professor Paul Teng is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

In the 2024 ASEAN leaders’ Declaration on Regional Biosafety and Biosecurity, ASEAN member states (AMS) made a collective call for the need to “ensure the provision of necessary human resources for biosafety and biosecurity in a sustainable manner through training, education and certification for all relevant personnel”. This new declaration from the ASEAN leaders demonstrates the increasing importance of strengthening biosecurity, together with biosafety, in Southeast Asia.

Compilation of the latest activities and publications in NTS-Asia Consortium.

This annual publication is the NTS Centre’s reflections on the events of the past year and contemplations on issues of non-traditional security in Southeast Asia and beyond. The NTS Year in Review 2024 comprises articles which reflect on the impact of recurrent and emerging NTS challenges on our nations and communities and discusses the intersections of different NTS issues in the region, such as climate change, biosecurity, nuclear security, women, peace and security, food security, health security, energy security, and humanitarian emergency. These articles draw out some of the potential pathways to addressing such issues. We hope that you will find these articles useful in providing a comprehensive understanding of the kinds of risks and threats we face today. Finally, as always, we showcase our Centre’s activities for the year and the varied publications of our researchers in 2024.

Energy subsidies in Indonesia are not a new phenomenon. These subsidies, particularly for Pertalite fuel, diesel fuel, and 3-kg LPG cylinders, were initially intended to maintain stable and affordable energy prices, especially for the underprivileged. However, the structure and magnitude of these subsidies have presented various challenges. First, the large allocation of energy subsidies threatens fiscal stability and long-term economic growth prospects. Second, substantial energy subsidies disrupt economic efficiency and environmental sustainability. Third, energy subsidies are often deemed ineffective in achieving  social equity and instead exacerbate social inequalities. These challenges further underline the need for a critical evaluation of the scale and management of energy subsidies.

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process to modernize security institutions for better accountability, inclusivity, and alignment with democratic values. This commentary highlights SSR’s role in enhancing governance, preventing conflicts, and fostering development. It also examines Bangladesh’s security sector challenges, such as political influence, emerging threats, and the need for reforms, while drawing insights from global SSR examples like Iraq, Colombia, and South Africa.

Abstract
In the midst of increasing legitimacy for muscular politics and militarization and the waning power of the UN to quell humanitarian crises, WISCOMP facilitated the coming together of diplomats and civil society actors from the European Union and India to reflect on women’s role vis a vis global, national and local levels. How if at all do they respond to the pressing need to ‘build peace’? This report compiles the views shared by women diplomats, researchers and grassroots peace practitioners on the Women Peace and security agenda – achievements, backsliding and the emerging challenges.