As the year draws to a close, it is timely to reflect on the latest developments in Singapore’s approach to food security. On 4 November 2025, the hand was once again set to the plough, with the announcement of “Singapore Food Story 2”, marking another transition point in the city-state’s food security strategy leading up to 2035.

A familiar dictum in management is that one cannot manage what one cannot measure. This dictum is relevant to Singapore’s self-sufficiency targets in domestic food production, with the refreshed strategy presenting a step forward in clarifying such targets. Still, to avoid loose ends, we need solid follow-through on public reporting at the commodity level to engender better public and private collaboration in achieving food self-sufficiency targets.

The Benefit of Clarity in Setting Commodity-Specific Targets

Singapore’s strategies for achieving food security have evolved over the past decade from the 2013 Singapore Food Security (SFS) Roadmap to the “30-by-30 goal” in 2019, and today’s Singapore Food Story 2.

A consistent element across these strategies has been the prioritisation of self-sufficiency targets for domestic production to meet domestic consumption, which serves as a buffer against disruptions in international trade, alongside the strategy of diversifying Singapore’s import sources.

Where these strategies differed was in clarity on self-sufficiency targets at the commodity level. The benefit of setting specific commodity-based targets is evident from the relative success of the earlier 2013 SFS Roadmap. Targets were set for leafy vegetables (10 per cent, up from a 7 per cent baseline in 2010), eggs (30 per cent, up from 22 per cent), and fish (15 per cent, up from 4 per cent).

By 2018, a clear trend of progress and improvement was evident, with 13 per cent self-sufficiency in leafy vegetables (double the 2010 baseline), 24 per cent in eggs (above the baseline), and 9 per cent in fish (double the baseline).

30-by-30 Goal: Lack of Target Clarity

By contrast, no commodity-specific production targets were set in the 2019 30-by-30 goal. Instead, the framing of self-sufficiency was broadened to a 30 per cent “nutritional self-sufficiency” target, with the remaining 70 per cent to be imported.

On one hand, this framing considered the diverse nutritional needs of the population rather than the quantity of commodities to be produced, thereby better capturing food security concerns. However, the nutrition-based framing of self-sufficiency made the requirements less concrete and specific than the previous commodity-quantity targets measured in tonnage of eggs, vegetables, and fish. It was not clarified which nutrients the food authority was prioritising, in terms of caloric, mineral, or vitamin content.

Given the complexity and ambiguity of the 30-by-30 goal, no baseline level nor progress updates on national nutritional self-sufficiency were ever published while the strategy was in place. In fact, the Singapore Food Agency’s (SFA) reports reflected commodity-based self-sufficiency in tonnage, even if the national strategy now required nutrition-based reporting.

While productivity has increased among recipients of productivity-enhancement grants in their pursuit of the 30-by-30 goal, the overall outcome is harder to assess today in the absence of published statistics on national nutrition self-sufficiency.

Singapore Food Story 2: The Need for Greater Clarity

Today, there is somewhat greater clarity with Singapore Food Story 2, which has slightly more defined targets for two commodity groups – fibres and proteins – that are sub-components of the previous national nutritional self-sufficiency goal. By 2035, the city-state will be 20 per cent self-sufficient in fibres (including commodities like fresh leafy and fruited vegetables, beansprouts, and mushrooms) and 30 per cent in proteins (including eggs and seafood). Another improvement is that the baseline levels are now published: 8 per cent for fibres and 26 per cent for proteins, as of 2024.

Yet the risk remains that Singapore Food Story 2’s targets will not be seen as hard targets but only as aspirations. This was, in fact, the predicament of the 30-by-30 “goal” which was initially considered a “target” but, in the interim before the announcement of Singapore Food Story 2, was seen only as an “aspiration”.

If the new strategy is to be credible, we need to provide further clarity by breaking down the targets for the fibre and protein commodity groups into more specific commodity targets. This would require annual reporting on target achievement at the commodity level, enabling earlier guidance when gaps arise. Doing so would also help set accountabilities across the private and public sectors, enabling timely strategic adjustments to achieve the 2035 fibre and protein self-sufficiency targets.

Addressing the Challenges to Profitability: Leafy Vegetables

By providing clear commodity-specific targets, the government will be able to provide more targeted investment to address the unique bottlenecks each commodity faces.

An underlying issue to address, previously observed at the commodity level, is the profitability challenge facing farming. For leafy vegetables, the previous focus was on improving productivity in terms of tonnage of food produced per hectare, given the limited land available. Focused R&D grants for technologies that boost productivity allowed for a 10 per cent productivity growth in vegetable farming from 2019 to 2024.

The SFA also provided additional land and facilities through tenders to enable the adoption of indoor-farm technologies, which can enhance productivity manifold through controlled growing environments and the ability to grow on multiple layers within vertical farms.

The irony was that despite greater availability of land, facilities, and technologies, the city-state saw its leafy vegetable farmers postpone expansion plans, scale down operations, and, in the worst cases, shut down farms. This discrepancy highlights a key challenge: getting private-sector farmers on board in ways that are profitable for them as well.

A 2019 report by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) identified a potential root cause: property tax on indoor farm facilities could affect the farmers’ profitability and, in turn, their expansion decisions. Property tax exemptions are common among Singapore’s strategic manufacturing industries, but they do not apply to upstream farm production.

Using the UrbanAgInvest tool (©NTU), the report found that about two-thirds of total investment costs in indoor farms are from fixed machinery, such as growing racks, temperature controls, smart LED lighting, and automation. As a result, farmers using indoor farm machinery would be assessed at much higher property taxes than farmers who do not adopt such technologies. Thus, the property tax disincentivised farm owners from leveraging technologies to expand their production.

Plug-and-Play Tenanted Spaces?

Under the Singapore Food Story 2, a solution to the property taxation cost issue is the initiative being explored today to provide “plug-and-play tenanted spaces” for farmers to do indoor vertical farming. Essentially, this would allow farmers to avoid paying such taxes, as they do not own the spaces.

But this raises the question: What rental rate would enable an expansion of domestic production of leafy vegetables while also providing sufficient tax revenues? In the decade to come, the realisation of Singapore’s refreshed food security strategy will hinge critically on how it pivots to create conducive incentive mechanisms that address the profitability challenges faced by each of its key commodities under fibre and protein groups, while balancing these with the city-state’s broader economic requirements.

About the Author

Jose Ma. Luis Montesclaros is a Research Fellow and the Food Security Lead at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Although largely overshadowed by Japan–China tensions sparked by concerns over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and remarks hinting at possible intervention in a Taiwan contingency, Japan’s foreign and security policy has been undergoing rapid reconfiguration since the launch of the Takaichi Sanae cabinet. For the first time since the Liberal Democratic Party’s founding in 1955, it lost its independent majority in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, and it had to rely on the Japan Innovation Party’s loose form of “external cooperation” following the departure of Komeito, its coalition partner of 26 years. Despite this fragile start, the Takaichi cabinet has maintained high approval ratings from the outset. Moreover, in just over a month since its inauguration, the cabinet has already driven changes across a wide range of areas, including politics, the economy, diplomacy, and security, with the pace of policy shifts in the foreign and security domain particularly striking. This raises a key question: under the Takaichi cabinet, in what direction, and in what ways, are Japan’s foreign and security policies changing?

From a policy perspective, the core changes can be summarized as follows:

① pushing to achieve the target of defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP ahead of schedule, by fiscal year 2025; ② initiating preparations to re-revise, by the end of 2026, the “Three Security Documents” that were revised in 2022; ③ establishing a “National Intelligence Agency” aimed at integrating intelligence systems, alongside renewed discussion of an anti-espionage law; ④ easing restrictions on defense exports and arms transfers by removing the “five-type” limitation under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; ⑤ ordering revisions to the Economic Security Promotion Act and concentrating investment in 17 strategic sectors; ⑥ formally articulating statements linking a Taiwan contingency to a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan; and ⑦ signaling the possibility of revising Article 9 of the Constitution and reconsidering the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

For South Korea, these changes carry a dual implication: enhanced deterrence on the one hand, and a deepening security dilemma on the other. Japan’s more proactive foreign and security posture could contribute to deterrence against North Korea and China. At the same time, however, it heightens the risk of crisis linkage among Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula; fuels regional arms competition; stimulates military activity; and increases pressure on South Korea regarding its role and burden-sharing responsibilities.

North Korea is turning toward the maritime domain. Backed by deepening strategic alignment with China and Russia and the rapid advancement of its military capabilities, Pyongyang has redefined the maritime domain as a multidimensional strategic space essential for regime survival and national development. It is now pursuing a systematic evolution of its maritime strategy that moves far beyond its traditional role as a coastal navy. The recent construction of large surface combatants, the unveiling of both conventional and nuclear-powered submarine equipped with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the launch of a new destroyer reflect an active push to modernize its naval forces. In parallel, Pyongyang has begun promoting new concepts such as “maritime sovereignty,” “blue-water navy,” and “intermediate waters,” signaling a clear intent to reshape the maritime status quo.

Structurally, the regime’s maritime strategy is dual-tracked. In the short term, sanctions-evading maritime activities, the sale of fishing rights, and access to foreign currency continue to serve as critical economic lifelines. Over the longer term, Pyongyang seeks to expand nuclear force employment options, strengthen trilateral ties with China and Russia, develop maritime tourism zones, and expand its fisheries sector. In this context, South Korea must respond to North Korea’s strengthening maritime domain awareness (MDA). First, Seoul should reinforce integrated maritime surveillance and early-warning capabilities through enhanced cooperation between the Navy and the Coast Guard to detect and respond to Pyongyang’s expanding blue-water capabilities and potential maritime provocations. Second, ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral naval cooperation should be strengthened, with emphasis on missile defense integration and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) interoperability to establish a naval-centered collective security framework. Third, South Korea should concretize its Indo-Pacific strategy to mitigate the regional security risks posed by North Korea’s expanding maritime strategy.

With the release of the Korea–U.S. Joint Fact Sheet on November 14, a new phase of progress in the nuclear field has been opened—namely, pathways toward uranium enrichment and reprocessing, as well as the introduction of nuclear-powered submarines. However, nuclear-powered submarines fall under the category of the “military use” of nuclear energy. It should therefore be noted that certain discussions within the government, particularly those concerning options for the self-procurement of fuel after the expiration of the Korea–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, could give rise to situations in which South Korea’s compliance with its non-proliferation obligations, and even its obligations related to the “peaceful use” of nuclear energy, may be called into question.

Even in the case of allied countries, the United States has established a comprehensive legal framework that enables it to impose strong and multi-layered sanctions in response to violations of nuclear non-proliferation principles. These include the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA), the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Under the Atomic Energy Act, all nuclear cooperation can be immediately suspended and the return of U.S.-origin nuclear fuel can be demanded, effectively forcing a shutdown of South Korea’s nuclear power plants. The Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act mandate the termination of all Foreign Military Sales (FMS), military assistance, and economic aid, as well as the blocking of support from international financial institutions such as the IMF. Furthermore, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), if the U.S. President declares a “national emergency,” the United States can freeze South Korean government assets within U.S. jurisdiction and completely exclude South Korea from the U.S. financial system, including dollar-based payment networks, thereby paralyzing the national economy as a whole.

The option of enriching and processing U.S.-provided nuclear materials to independently supply fuel for nuclear-powered submarines would constitute a violation of the Korea–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement even if undertaken after the agreement’s expiration, as it would not qualify as a U.S.-approved “peaceful use” of nuclear energy. As such, it would significantly increase the risk of triggering U.S. sanctions laws. The South Korean government must take this risk seriously and, under the guiding principle of a strict separation between the “peaceful use” and “military use” of nuclear energy, work to complete the relevant domestic and international legal procedures. Uranium enrichment and reprocessing should be addressed as matters related to the “peaceful use” of nuclear energy and discussed strictly within the framework of the Korea–U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The introduction of nuclear-powered submarines and the procurement of their fuel, by contrast, must be recognized as matters related to the “military use” of nuclear energy and pursued through separate legal tracks, including consultations with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In this process, publicly disclosing compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and clearly reaffirming that the denuclearization of North Korea remains a core policy objective would further reinforce South Korea’s commitment to fulfilling its non-proliferation obligations in the international community.

This annual publication is the NTS Centre’s reflections on the events of the past year and contemplations on issues of non-traditional security in Southeast Asia and beyond. The NTS Year in Review 2025 comprises articles which reflect on the impact of recurrent and emerging NTS challenges on our nations and communities and discusses the intersections of different NTS issues in the region, such as climate change, water security, planetary health, biosecurity, nuclear security, women, peace and security, food security, and energy security. These articles draw out some of the potential pathways to addressing such issues. We hope that you will find these articles useful in providing a comprehensive understanding of the kinds of risks and threats we face today. Finally, as always, we showcase our Centre’s activities for the year and the varied publications of our researchers in 2025.

The second Trump administration has reversed US climate policy, withdrawing from the Paris Agreement and defunding key international climate initiatives. This move creates a leadership and resource vacuum that weakens global climate action and leaves vulnerable regions like Southeast Asia facing direct financial and technical setbacks. Furthermore, the administration’s policies accelerate climate-health damages by prioritising economic and military goals. The disruption arising from these changes, however, creates an opportunity for ASEAN to assert regional leadership. This report recommends a three-pronged strategy involving (1) establishing leadership in global carbon markets by harmonising a regional framework, (2) championing multilateral climate diplomacy with key partners, and (3) pioneering a regional data and resilience hub to counter the loss of US scientific support.

The rapid convergence of artificial intelligence (AI) and biotechnology presents a profound dual-use challenge. While these advances offer transformative capabilities, they also expand the range and accessibility of tools that could be misused for hostile purposes, including the design of novel pathogens or the circumvention of existing detection systems.

Current governance frameworks for both life sciences and AI often operate in isolation, leaving critical blind spots in governance and accountability. Closing these gaps requires more coordinated action by and among stakeholders in biological sciences and AI to enhance transparency and safeguards in scientific research.

ASEAN can strengthen regional AI-biosecurity governance by leveraging existing institutional platforms, promoting self-regulation, standardising transparency principles, and building capacity across member states. A multi-stakeholder approach involving scientists, the business sector, ethicists, and civil society will be essential to building trust and mitigating AI-related biological risks.

There has been a rising chorus of organisations calling for the need for food systems transformation (FST) globally in furthering the sustainable development goals. Yet, FST remains a much-debated issue, given differences in beliefs on the types of transformations needed, and how these are to be achieved. These include debates over government support to agriculture as going against free trade norms; disagreements surrounding the prioritisation of environmental concerns amidst climate change’s negative impacts on food supplies; and issues over the benefits and challenges in implementing environmental social governance (ESG) frameworks. Such global debates, however, are better addressed when contextualised at the lower geographic levels, considering the unique circumstances of regions and countries. We highlight their relevance in Southeast Asia, and argue for the need for a pragmatic approach to FST.

Ten years on from the landmark Paris Agreement on climate change, this year’s Conference of the Parties (COP30) in Belém, Brazil, emphasised the importance of collective action. Yet, continued tensions with civil society and Indigenous actors, as most visibly manifested in activists storming the venue, highlight a persisting trend of climate action failing to connect with those most affected.

Amid oil drilling expansion, forest clearing for a connecting highway to the host city, and soaring accommodation costs, COP30 has become the epitome of many of the shortages facing global climate governance. In its current performative structure, the framework risks being shaped by superficial commitments and detachment from people on the ground level. Arriving at a crossroads, the way forward starts by asking: Who is COP really for?

An Agenda off the Mark

Since 1992, COP – the annual summit tied to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) – has held the crucial role of seeking to move governance beyond national borders in addressing a global crisis. Yet, while each summit concludes with new provisions celebrated by many state representatives, gaps in commitment and funding remain persistent features of the wider process.

A root cause stems from the decision-making agent itself: states. In its current form, states may freely interact at COPs on the basis of protecting national interests and maximising gains. Competing interests among the more than 190 participating state actors have therefore led to outcomes that are too often watered down. Continued heavy resistance to a fossil fuel “phase-out” and this year’s infighting over who will host next year’s summit demonstrate a state-centric approach that derails the event’s wider purpose and ultimately stalls the agenda.

These challenges come in addition to a wider flaw in perspective. State-centrism means that action largely responds to climate change as a national security threat. Thus, calls for accelerated responses primarily come from states whose very existence is at stake. This approach overlooks the persistent climate-induced pressures facing local communities, including rising economic hardship, livelihood losses and displacement. While these factors may eventually contribute to national insecurity, the primary effects manifest at the human level, regardless of national borders.

Remaining Tensions with Frontline Communities

Against this backdrop, this year’s call for COP30 to embrace the spirit of “Mutirão”, meaning collective action and mobilisation, was a welcomed emphasis. To this end, signs of progress were visible, including a tenfold increase to more than 3,000 invited Indigenous participants and the launch of an Indigenous leadership training programme. However, these advancements have been overshadowed by the simultaneous expansion of oil drilling and infrastructure construction to host COP30, inflicting fresh environmental damage on the Amazon rainforest.

As a result, tensions at this year’s COP should not come as a surprise. Between a women’s Indigenous protest demanding a full stop to Amazonian inroads, activists storming the event itself, and a 5,000-person protest flotilla in the waters outside Belém, it is increasingly clear that many demanding climate justice have become alienated by the process itself.

These events extend beyond Belém; the ongoing COP boycott by the world’s arguably most well-known climate figure, Greta Thunberg, highlights the disconnect. Once celebrated by world leaders and the media alike, her increasingly confrontational approach towards the very structures that prevent radical action has put her at odds with key parties at COPs, highlighting the persistent gap between performative climate diplomacy and the realities facing communities.

Similar patterns of exclusion from climate governance are apparent when highlighting many of the world’s most climate-affected populations. In a climate-sensitive Southeast Asia, this is strongly visible, where those disproportionately affected by climate change include rural farmers and ethnic minorities. For these communities, attending a COP30 at the mouth of the Amazon, multiple flights away and with high accommodation costs, is a near impossibility, while finding civil society actors who can accurately elevate their grievances may be equally difficult.

These difficulties may explain why only 17 per cent of public climate adaptation finance reaches local communities, and why, in 2022, low-income countries received roughly one-tenth of reported climate finance. Thus, to avoid the risk of reinforcing economic inequalities and placing climate funds in the wrong hands, connecting with the most climate-vulnerable populations remains an imperative.

The Growing Influence of COP Lobbyists

An additional factor in the stalling of the climate agenda stems from the growing role of COP “lobbyism”, particularly from the oil and gas sector. Lobbyist presence has risen substantially in the last decade, where the latest COPs have seen fossil fuel lobbyists surpassing the combined number of representatives from the world’s ten most climate vulnerable countries, and doubling Indigenous people’s representatives. At COP30, this trend continued, with over 1,600 fossil fuel lobbyists present, marking the largest proportional representation at a COP to date. Carrying financial and political leverage on states, the role of lobbyists has widely been regarded as further weakening climate action.

Due to its competing interests with progressive climate initiatives, the growing lobbyist COP influence has been described by critics as “having arms dealers run peace talks”. In peace studies, the term “spoilers” has been used for actors who intentionally undermine peace processes; at COP summits, a similar dynamic is visible. By granting spoilers influence, climate governance risks imprecise and incomplete action while reinforcing existing power asymmetries, ultimately at the expense of climate-vulnerable communities.

Rethinking the COP Framework

The traditional climate governance model, linked to sovereignty, national security, and maximised gains, exposes major shortcomings. Incorporating a human security approach represents a necessary amendment for COP to reconnect with human impacts.

Greater inclusivity remains critical. While parallel summits at COP30 have successfully brought together civil society, Indigenous actors, the private sector, academia, and other actors, on-the-ground experiences and knowledge still need to be translated into action. Encouraging states to include various community actors as part of their official delegations, potentially assisted through gender, socio-economic and Indigenous quotas, would enhance their influence in negotiations.

Inclusivity needs assistance by fostering greater accessibility. While colourful and symbolic host cities appear attractive, these endeavours may ultimately undermine the wider ambition if placed in unaffordable locations that themselves inflict environmental harm. Stricter hosting preconditions, or simply returning COP summits to an annual event at the UNFCCC headquarters in Bonn would help shift attention from symbolic performance to action.

Finally, increased attention towards COP lobbyism is critical. While the UN system centres around inclusivity, one must assess whether this principle legitimises participation from actors with disruptive intentions; a more productive agenda would have all participants work towards the original COP ambition. While this has raised risks of alienating the private sector or states altogether, the expanding role of green finance and reputational leverage in COP participation makes reducing spoiler influence a feasible target.

The increased emphasis on collective action at COP30 needs support at future summits through concrete steps that underscore that it is more than a performative platform. Only then can global climate governance regain traction and make critical advancements towards its original goal.

About The Author

Adam X. Hansen is a Research Analyst at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS Centre), in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

Key takeaways

• The global race for critical minerals is accelerating. Rare earths, essential for producing high-performance magnets, batteries and defence technologies, now anchor many emerging global supply chains. The US-China geoeconomic rivalry has added additional dimensions of competition, as supply chain bifurcation and export controls actively reshape global mineral supply chains, offering opportunities for Malaysia to broaden its geoeconomic agency.
• Malaysia is endowed with significant deposits of rare earths and is home to one of the world’s largest refineries (i.e., Lynas Rare Earths, Ltd.), yet local industrial integration remains constrained by various governance bottlenecks, a lack of upstream integration and an underdeveloped downstream industrial base. Successfully navigating these challenges and integrating a full-cycle supply chain could unlock an estimated RM91.9 billion in GDP contribution and 96,900 jobs by 2050. (See Appendix II for more details)
• Challenges in the sector include a fragmented governance structure between the federal and state levels of government, resulting in non-optimal coordination and uncertainties that discourage sector investment. The lack of a robust upstream supply ecosystem likewise discourages mid- and downstream development of refining and magnet fabrication capacity, impacting its ability to secure higher value-added stages in the value chain. Lastly, funding for geological mapping and exploration is needed to further drive the sector.
• To overcome these challenges, Malaysia must establish a coherent and integrated governance architecture to guide sector development, such as deepening the institutionalisation of the Special Task Force for the Development of the Rare Earths Industry by creating an advisory and industrial coordination body, while aligning with state agencies. Operators should likewise be tied to compliance audits to maintain regulatory certainty, efficacy and investor confidence. In parallel, a circular economy framework for residue management would enhance material recovery and create additional pathways for sustainable industrial linkages.
• Further, a clear upstream-to-downstream strategy must drive end-to-end manufacturing. This entails creating formal pathways for venture capital and exploration funding, expanding global research and technical cooperation through a unified centre of excellence and localising supply chains for critical chemical inputs. Vertical and horizontal integration must remain a priority, and sustainable mining methods must be incentivised through partnerships with global firms and institutions. SME “plug-in” programmes should likewise be considered to promote inclusive growth across the supply chain.
• Lastly, there is a need to embed ESG, social trust and sustainability principles as a central pillar of sector development. Inculcating the principles of free, prior and informed consent in community engagement is crucial to prevent and protect sector legitimacy, while a robust traceability framework is needed to verify the provenance of materials and ensure alignment with global standards and best practices.