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When North Korea recently revealed that it is constructing a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), there was no response from China. By contrast, when South Korea and the United States announced a security agreement to construct conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) and enrich uranium at last October’s leaders’ summit, Chinese state media and military experts claimed that South Korea’s SSNs would undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and pose a high risk of nuclear proliferation. They portrayed South Korea as if it were making a dangerous choice in violation of international norms. However, behind these claims is the intention to obstruct the expansion of South Korea’s defense capabilities and the development of the ROK–U.S. alliance.
China’s “nuclear non-proliferation” claims directly contradict its own actions. Over the past several years, China has significantly strengthened its nuclear forces by building a full nuclear triad consisting of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 Report on Chinese Military Power, China currently possesses approximately 600 nuclear warheads, a number projected to reach 1,000 by around 2030. In addition to its existing arsenal of roughly 400 ICBMs, China is constructing 100 new nuclear missile silos. This represents a dramatic increase compared to the early 2000s, when China possessed around 230 nuclear warheads and only about 20 ICBMs. China claims that its nuclear buildup is a “defensive measure,” but this directly contradicts Article VI of the NPT, which calls on nuclear-weapon states to pursue gradual nuclear disarmament.
A more serious problem is China’s de facto toleration of North Korea’s nuclear buildup, which is a direct challenge to the international non-proliferation regime. North Korea has advanced the miniaturization of nuclear warheads and brought its SLBM capabilities to the stage of operational deployment. In addition, Kim Jong Un has pledged to “exponentially” increase his nuclear arsenal, but China has defended this under the pretext of North Korea’s “legitimate security concerns” while blocking sanctions and resolutions at the United Nations Security Council together with Russia.
China’s attitude of taking issue with South Korea’s SSNs and defense capability buildup is a blatant double standard. South Korea’s SSNs will be defensive assets that do not carry nuclear warheads and are fully compatible with the international non-proliferation regime. By contrast, North Korea’s SLBMs and SSBNs, which are explicitly intended to carry nuclear warheads, represent textbook violations of non-proliferation norms.
Given North Korea’s growing nuclear and missile threats and China’s rapid expansion of its nuclear forces, mere “promises of extended deterrence” by the United States are insufficient to guarantee South Korea’s security. South Korea must therefore pursue the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula in order to send a clear and unmistakable deterrent signal to both North Korea and China. Just as NATO’s forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe during the Cold War deterred Soviet miscalculation, the Korean Peninsula likewise requires a credible and visible deterrent.
Furthermore, as the authoritarian coalition among China, North Korea, and Russia deepens in Asia, there is also a need for an Asian version of NATO. With South Korea, the United States, and Japan as its axes, and linked with Australia, the Philippines, and India, such a multilayered cooperative grouping is essential to deter China’s unilateral military expansion.
South Korea must now make its position clear: our security is our prerogative, and no other country has the right to dictate our choices. The redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons and establishment of an Asian version of NATO are not provocations but rather deterrence measures, which are realistic choices to safeguard peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
Last August, following a call between President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping, President Trump said “He (Xi) told me, ‘I will never do that (invasion of Taiwan) as long as you are president.’” Then, when asked about the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan at a press conference after meeting with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on October 20, President Trump again dismissed the prospect, saying that “China does not want to do that.” He added that no one would dare to confront the United States, which possesses the world’s strongest military power. While confidence in U.S. military strength is good, such statements underestimate China’s obsession with the “One China” principle. This could be interpreted to mean that while China may not invade Taiwan during Trump’s presidency, it might do so after 2029.
In 2022, William Burns, the then-director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), revealed that “President Xi has instructed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese military leadership to be ready by 2027 to invade Taiwan.” The year 2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. At the 20th Chinese Communist Party Congress in October 2023, which marked the beginning of his third term, President Xi emphasized that resolving the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese people and declared that he “would not give up the use of force and reserve the option to take all necessary measures against external forces and a very small number of Taiwan independence supporters.”
President Trump is confident that China will not challenge U.S. military power. But Beijing has long employed an “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy” that leverages its geopolitical advantages within the Indo-Pacific to prevent the United States from occupying or accessing key strategic points in the region. It has also steadily built up its military capabilities to support this.
At the Victory Day parade held in Tiananmen Square last September, China showcased supersonic anti-ship missiles, long-range cruise missiles, and hypersonic missiles. These weapons systems can directly threaten Taiwan and U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups that would be deployed to the region in a contingency, as well as U.S. bases such as Guam. President Xi needs to showcase achievements as he seeks to extend his rule indefinitely beyond his third term. For this reason alone, he has strong incentives to take military action against Taiwan.
Some argue that the likelihood of China actually invading Taiwan is low because an amphibious assault on Taiwan would not be easy and China would have to suffer massive casualties. However, from China’s perspective, it does not necessarily have to launch a full-scale invasion to effectively seize Taiwan. A May 2024 study by the Brookings Institution in the United States found that the share of Taiwanese respondents who worried about a cross-Strait conflict rose from 57.4% in 2021 to 64.8% in 2023—a 7.4 percentage point increase. Similarly, those who believed President Xi was more likely to use force compared to the past exceeded a majority at 57.6% (compared to 46.1% in 2021). This indicates that a growing number of Taiwanese are concerned about a Chinese invasion. China could exploit this anxiety among the Taiwanese people by striking Taiwan’s key points with missiles and blockading the island, followed by large-scale psychological warfare to compel Taiwan to surrender without a direct invasion.
Whatever scenario China chooses, it will try to weaken U.S. resolve to intervene or otherwise restrict the deployment of U.S. forces to the Taiwan Strait in order to minimize the damage that could result from a military conflict with the United States. It is vital to note that in this case, North Korea could become a very useful asset and partner for China. If North Korea starts a war on the Korean Peninsula first, the forces the United States might deploy to the Taiwan Strait will inevitably be limited. Even if North Korea conducts a military provocation while a Taiwan Strait crisis is already happening, the United States will face the dilemma of having to disperse and operate its forces across two simultaneous theaters of war. It should be understood that such calculations by China are embedded behind the recent North Korea-China rapprochement. Recent examples include President Xi Jinping inviting Kim Jong Un to stand by his side and treating him with special courtesy through banquets and summit talks, as well as dispatching Chinese Premier Li Qiang to the October 10 celebration of the Korean Workers’ Party 80th founding anniversary.
Even from North Korea’s perspective, cooperation with China has significant value. A Taiwan Strait crisis would present Kim Jong Un with a golden opportunity to achieve “the complete territorial conquest of the Korean Peninsula” under the doctrine of “two hostile states” between North and South Korea. Even without a full-scale war, North Korea would likely attempt to maximize the use of its “nuclear shadow” by occupying parts of South Korean territory, such as islands in the West Sea, then declaring a ceasefire and threatening to use nuclear weapons if South Korea refuses. In this case, even if not the entire territory were occupied, South Korea would be reduced to a hostage to North Korean nuclear weapons, lose all initiative in inter-Korean relations, and face an existential threat to the survival of its society.
A failure to deter or defend against war in either the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula would lead U.S. allies and partners to interpret it as the failure of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy and a loss of strategic primacy vis-à-vis China. This would erode trust in Washington’s security commitments, accelerating the decline of U.S. influence in the region. Authoritarian powers, including China, Russia, and North Korea, would pursue more aggressive and coercive policies throughout the Indo-Pacific. The Trump administration’s ambition to “Make America Great Again” would also ring hollow.
The way to prevent this worst-case scenario is to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula and establish an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Redeploying several dozen of the tactical nuclear weapons, which were withdrawn in 1991 by the United States, would send a clear message to Pyongyang that any use of nuclear weapons would trigger immediate and devastating retaliation, guaranteeing the collapse of the Kim regime. This would not only block North Korea’s “nuclear shadow” but also weaken its willingness to provoke conflict linked to a Taiwan Strait crisis.
Deploying tactical nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pacific could reduce the likelihood of a Taiwan Strait crisis by concretely reaffirming U.S. security commitments to regional allies. This is because if the North Korea–China–Russia axis pursues both conventional military cooperation and nuclear-armed alignment, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons will demonstrate U.S. willingness to strengthen its means to counter this.
Considering that the United States has no troops stationed in Taiwan and also that Japan firmly rejects the redeployment of nuclear weapons as the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, the most optimal location in East Asia to host tactical nuclear weapons is South Korea. South Korea already possesses the necessary military infrastructure, including multiple air force bases and F-35A fighter jets capable of being converted into dual-capable aircraft (DCA) to deliver B61-12 tactical nuclear bombs. It could also pursue the option of mounting low-yield nuclear warheads on South Korea’s Hyunmoo ballistic missiles.
If “nuclear sharing” between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies were achieved backed by the redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, it would also serve as valuable groundwork for establishing an “Asian NATO.” An Asian NATO consisting of South Korea, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and India would become a safeguard to deter authoritarian powers’ ambitions and aggressive actions. Only when such an environment is established can regional countries cooperate and coexist, and only then can the United States truly “become great.”
It is necessary to persuade the United States that redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula is vital not only for peace on the Korean Peninsula but also for preventing a crisis in the Taiwan Strait and for the stability of the entire Indo-Pacific region. South Korea must also actively demand firm guarantees for the U.S. extended deterrence commitment. South Korea should steadfastly maintain its posture for deterrence and defense on the Korean Peninsula, while clearly expressing its determination to expand its contribution to regional stability and secure the capability to realize it. Only when these conditions are met can both stability in the Taiwan Strait and peace on the Korean Peninsula be achieved.
Malaysia’s ban on exports of unprocessed rare earth metals this week signals that the Southeast Asian country has a realistic shot – on its own terms – at feeding the mineral-hungry United States amid its strained trade ties with the world’s dominant supplier, China, according to analysts.
Kuala Lumpur will bar exports of unprocessed rare earth minerals, which are globally prized raw materials used in a range of electronic hardware, to keep supplies onshore for investment in downstream industries, a Malaysian official said this week.
The country’s minister of investment, trade and industry, Tengku Zafrul Abdul Aziz, told the Malay Mail news outlet that foreign investors could jump into the downstream Malaysian rare earths sector if their projects involve local mineral processing, job creation and technology transfers. The processed rare earth metals could be exported.
While many countries sit on rare earth reserves, analysts say Malaysia’s industry is likely to take off because it already has processing capacity, and because US buyers of rare earth metals are scrambling for non-Chinese sources.
“Malaysia’s existing capabilities give it a head start in integrating into global supply chains,” said Qarrem Kassim, an analyst at the Institute of Strategic & International Studies Kuala Lumpur.
“Applying this export ban equally to all sides is a signal that Malaysia is willing to exercise its geoeconomic agency to prioritise its own development needs,” he said. “This may result in potential foreign investment down the road.”
The Southeast Asian country’s Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Sustainability had said in a “business model” last year that it would “delve into” mining for heavy rare earth metals that are essential components in everyday devices such as smartphones and computers, as well as in technologies such as electric vehicles and solar panels.
Officials have advanced that ambition this year by laying plans for two more processing plants, the Malaysian national Applied Research and Development Centre’s technology advisory head, Nordin Ramli, said this month on his LinkedIn page.
A strategic rare earth element sector would strengthen [Malaysia’s] geoeconomic leverage with the US, the EU, Japan and others
– Qarrem Kassim, analyst
The ministry’s business model specifically calls for the development of “ion-adsorption clay rare earth elements”, which are relatively easy to extract.
Malaysia already hosts a major processing firm, the Lynas Malaysia subsidiary of Australia-based Lynas Rare Earths. Lynas Malaysia runs the world’s biggest rare earths processing compound outside China, using mostly Australian feedstock.
Lynas Malaysia contributes 11 per cent of global rare earth metals, “with the potential to increase its contribution”, according to the business model.
The business model, formulated over two years, said global demand for a type of “super-magnets” made from rare earths is projected to grow by 114 per cent in 2030 over 2020 levels.
With Malaysia’s total reserve of rare earth elements valued at US$175 billion, according to an East Asia Forum report last week, the country’s efforts to double down on rare earths follow concerns in the West about whether China will curb exports again.
In response to increases in US tariffs announced in April, China imposed export controls on seven rare earth elements and permanent magnets, requiring companies to obtain government permits before shipping them overseas.
The export controls sent shock waves through global supply chains. Following trade talks with US officials in London in early June, China’s Ministry of Commerce said late that month that it would “speed up the approval of export permits”. In July, China’s exports of permanent magnets rose to a six-month high, marking a second month of growth after the government pledged to accelerate export-permit approvals for the rare earth derivative.
“Given that Malaysia has a trade-oriented foreign policy, a strategic rare earth element sector would strengthen its geoeconomic leverage with the US, the EU, Japan and others as they seek to diversify their supply chains,” Kassim said.
The Lynas processing facility in Malaysia has become much more strategically significant in 2025
– Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific Economics
In May, Malaysia began issuing non-preferential certificates of origin for US-bound exports. Rare earths had been “used as a negotiation tool” in Malaysia’s talks with the US, said Tham Siew Yean, a visiting senior fellow with the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore.
“The rare earth element processing landscape is going through a period of intense disruption in the medium term, as Western governments and multinationals try to establish more secure supply chains,” said Rajiv Biswas, CEO of the research firm Asia-Pacific Economics.
“As the US and EU are trying to reduce their supply-chain vulnerability to Chinese imports of rare earth products, the Lynas processing facility in Malaysia has become much more strategically significant in 2025,” he added.
Chinese firms are likely to be among the investors keen on joining Malaysia’s downstream rare earths sector, analysts said.
China, the only country currently capable of producing all 17 rare earth elements on the periodic table, was said in April to have agreed to share processing technology with Malaysia as a boost to economic ties. China accounts for more than 60 per cent of global rare earth mining and 90 per cent of processing output.
Malaysia needs more technology for purification, centrifuging – the separation of solids from liquids – and shipping, to level up its rare earths sector, said Charles Chang, a finance professor at Fudan University in Shanghai. Malaysia has the capacity to expand its sector within two to four years, Chang said.
But Kassim noted that since China currently bans the export of refining technologies, this “fundamentally limits” its scope of cooperation with Malaysia.
Chinese developers of wind power and new-energy vehicles still need a supply of rare earths, however, as both are “being deployed at a rapid pace” that could be fuelled by Malaysian supplies, said Jon Hykawy, president of Toronto-based industry advisory Stormcrow Capital.
“These ionic clay deposits generally contain a higher proportion of valuable and truly rare heavy rare earths, like dysprosium and terbium, that are important when manufacturing magnets to be used in the wind power or automotive sectors,” he said.
The government’s business model calls for “fast-tracking” the domestic rare earth supply chain. “Timing is crucial, as heightened US-Sino trade tensions have created an investment window,” Kassim said.
Abstract
This book explores the intersection of climate change and security in the Indo-Pacific, from the South China Sea disputes to national and regional security practices in India, Japan and Southeast Asia, highlighting the vulnerability of countries facing extreme weather, sea-level rise, and geopolitical tensions.
The Indo-Pacific is the world’s most exposed region to natural hazards, and climate change is highly likely to impact the frequency and severity of these events, threatening people’s lives and livelihoods. Over the last two decades, research into the security implications of climate change has gained considerable interest among scholars and policy analysts across the world. Evidence-based research has shown how the impact of climate change such as sea-level rise, long droughts and extreme weather events have led to loss of livelihoods, economic downturns, forced migration and health threats from emerging infectious diseases. The effects of climate change in turn have led to greater potential for conflicts breaking out in societies most affected by climate change. As countries in the region face both climate challenges and strategic competition, their experiences offer valuable insights into how we can tackle this issue.
This book is essential reading for students, scholars and policymakers engaged in the fields of climate change, security studies, and international relations.
The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Third World Quarterly.
Urban renewal is crucial in an ever-urbanising country but only if done right.
Urban renewal refers to the rejuvenation of dilapidated areas within an urban setting. It is a longstanding issue that has plagued many countries across the globe as urban settlements expand at unprecedented rates. With 80% of the Malaysian population expected to reside in urban areas by 2030, the government is rightfully worried about the physical and environmental harms that urban degeneration may bring, raising a sense of urgency.
As such, the Urban Renewal Act, set to be tabled during by the Ministry of Housing and Local Government, has been proposed to facilitate the process of urban redevelopment. This piece of legislation aims to undercut longstanding processes and regulations impeding the restoration of old buildings. Historically, the Strata Titles Act 1985 required unanimous consent from property owners, complicating redevelopment efforts. With the proposal of the latest act, consent thresholds are now determined by building age instead.
While well-meaning in its intention to expedite redevelopment processes hindered by the strict consent threshold imposed upon by the Strata Titles Act 1985, concerns remain. Anxiety surrounding this act stems from fears that careless implementation may result in the displacement of local populations and the gentrification of communities to make way for private development.
At present, a total of 534 urban developments have been identified as in need of renewal, with 139 in Kuala Lumpur alone, putting thousands of residents at risk in Malaysia’s capital and beyond. This has raised alarm bells among civil society and residents, who fear a potential abuse of this legislation in favour of private developers.
Murky stakeholder engagement
The views and feedback of both proprietors and tenants must be meaningfully sought after and included in the redevelopment process. Currently, the government has yet to outline fully the extent of stakeholder involvement throughout the renewal process. For example, consent must be obtained from property owners are only sought after to obtain their consent for redevelopment, with little clarity over their continued involvement once a renewal agreement has been attained.
In this regard, proprietors must not only be involved throughout the process but their feedback must also be incorporated holistically. This would ensure a redevelopment plan that is responsive to the needs of its residents.
Beyond proprietors, and while acknowledging that they may not have the same rights as owners, the opinions of tenants must also be heard. At present, no formal mechanisms exist to incorporate their perspectives, effectively excluding them from all stages of decision-making. This lack of involvement fails to account for tenants facing the greatest risk of displacement, particularly if proprietors agree to redevelopment without safeguards in place to protect those renting or occupying the units in question.
Governing bodies lack diversity in views
Another pain point is the ambiguity surrounding the composition and impartiality of the State Executive Committees – the organisational bodies whose responsibility is to approve and monitor urban redevelopment projects. Currently, the draft act proposes only one government agency representative to be appointed at the discretion of the Menteri Besar or Chief Minister, while the remaining committee members are drawn entirely by the state government.
Ensuring broad representation is pivotal as two of the three pathways to initiate urban renewal fall under these committees’ purview. As such, a lack of broader representation may limit on-the-ground insights, potentially risking community needs over the interests of private developers. This risk can be mitigated by ensuring the inclusion of municipal, district and city council representatives, as well as civil society and representatives of homeowners’ associations.
Compensation beyond monetary gain
Presently, compensation promised to proprietors is typically offered either in the form of a financial payment for relocation or a sum higher than the current market price of the unit if proprietors choose to remain. However, compensation related to housing cannot be measured purely in monetary terms.
In highly urbanised areas like Kuala Lumpur, the rising market value of land and housing makes these spatial components increasingly significant. Proprietors may be displaced from well-connected areas and resettled in peripheral localities, where daily expenses are higher and opportunities are limited. Without factoring in these realities, relevant authorities risk offering compensation that is ultimately inadequate.
This form of inequitable compensation risks pricing out former residents, making way for more affluent populations and accelerating gentrification. Left unaddressed, such displacement will entrench spatial inequalities and trap already vulnerable groups into cycles of poverty from which they may have struggled to escape from. Therefore, a potential solution should account for spatial elements which influence cost of living standards, such as proximity to business centres, access to education and healthcare, as well as public transportation access. This can present itself in the form of priority placement at redeveloped localities which have similar levels of access to key amenities.
Lessons from abroad
The core tenets of successful urban renewal initiatives are cooperation, inclusivity and social equity. As such, several lessons can be taken from countries which have successfully implemented their own urban renewal regulations.
First, urban renewal must be holistic. This entails redevelopment that not only addresses changes to physical infrastructure but also embeds the economic and social wellbeing of residents into the planning process. One such example of this is Germany which, through its Programme for Green Urban Areas (Zukunft Stadtgrün), has helped facilitate the incorporation of urban green spaces in population-dense areas via funding of interlinking green spaces to connect residential spaces. Through this, urban redevelopment is framed as an issue extending beyond the borders of a residential development to include environmental quality and access to public amenities as part and parcel of liveability standards. Germany’s approach to holistic living thus ensures that redevelopment projects not only create safer homes but also a better quality of life for all.
Second, urban renewal must be cooperative. A centralised approach to urban redevelopment without the inclusion of lower rungs of governance may jeopardise the efficacy of urban renewal efforts. Countries like South Korea have noted this blind spot and taken steps to ensure a governance format centred on multilevel stakeholder cooperation.
The involvement of citizens into planning processes is wide-ranging, spanning the ability to request administrative documents for upcoming developments, the capacity to hold public consultations and hearings with private entities. Residents can even spearhead urban rehabilitation projects of their own. More importantly, the government has recognised the need for citizen participation in all forms, thus offering them avenues to do so irrespective of institutional affiliation. This approach encourages transparency and trust in governmental procedures to be fostered, allowing for redevelopment plans to reflect the lived realities and priorities of communities.
Third, urban renewal cannot be driven solely by private sector interests. Despite the government’s intention to shift away from federal funding in exchange for costs to be borne by the private sector, government-led funding and initiatives must be included to counteract potential power imbalances. Germany excels in this regard, with their Urban Development Support Programme providing funding to municipalities to champion community-led solutions for sustainable towns and cities. This programme allows for grassroots movements to encourage social cohesion through planning, a factor potentially sidelined by private developers who fail to incorporate diverse perspectives of residents.
Promise of more vibrant cities
Overall, this act comes at an opportune time, as localities with large population densities require safe spaces to thrive in. However, caution must be exercised as the risks of gentrification and displacement loom large. Therefore, urban renewal presents a balancing act for the government – managing public opinion and concerns, as well as allaying the fears of the public concerning the possibility of displacement, all while communicating the realities of urban renewal. This is a necessary step in a world where cities must continuously adapt to ageing infrastructure, growing populations, and ever-changing spatial needs.
A financial windfall should not be the only benefit of this act to property owners. Equally important is the opportunity to reside in a thriving residential area, with the option for holistic and equitable compensation. Ultimately, a pro-resident act is what is needed – not to turn over a profit – but to ensure that all Malaysians, regardless of income level, have the option to live and participate in the development of safe and vibrant homes.
Abstract
Some of the most pressing dangers for the survival and stability of states and societies originate from nonmilitary sources. Focusing on Southeast Asia, this Asia Policy roundtable addresses the impacts of an increasingly unstable global order on nontraditional security issues, including food security, energy security, health security, gender security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the building of state capacity and resilience.
Abstract
Advancing small modular reactor (SMR) technology presents a viable, clean energy alternative from nuclear power, addressing the escalating energy demands in Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian countries. The East Asian region is witnessing a renewed interest in nuclear power, with Northeast Asian nations actively participating in business and technological investments for developing SMR projects. Concurrently, Southeast Asian countries are exploring SMRs as a potential future source of clean energy for commercial use.
This article provides an overview of SMR projects in Northeast Asia and recent developments in Southeast Asia. It examines the potential implications of SMR deployment on nuclear safety and security regimes and how countries in the region can play an active role in reviewing and, if necessary, reshaping civilian nuclear governance to accommodate and address the specific challenges posed by deploying new types of reactors in the region.
In Southeast Asia, porous borders are closely associated with transnational security challenges, including environmental degradation, irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking of women and children. Against a rapidly changing environment, the concept of security has evolved, encompassing not only traditional human security challenges but also unseen threats. One such novel threat comes from lethal biological diseases, pathogens, toxins and weapons, collectively referred to as biosecurity threats.
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Abstract
In Southeast Asia, porous borders are closely associated with transnational security challenges, including environmental degradation, irregular migration, smuggling and human trafficking of women and children. Against a rapidly changing environment, the concept of security has evolved further encompassing not only traditional human security challenges but also unseen threats. One such ‘novel’ threat comes from lethal biological diseases, pathogens, toxins, and weapons, also commonly referred to as biosecurity threats.
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